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Abstract 
Corporate governance scandals and the global financial crisis have led to calls for better risk disclosure. 
However, such disclosure may be stifled by the proprietary cost hypothesis that firms limit voluntary disclosure 
to avoid risk of adverse actions. Against this background, several studies have examined the determinants of risk 
disclosure in corporate annual reports. The purpose of this paper is to review empirical evidences on risk 
disclosure determinants in the literature. The researcher uses qualitative-archival research methodology, 
involving secondary information obtained from journal articles, MSc dissertation and finance texts. It is 
discovered that most of the findings suffered from discrepancies and inconsistency even though the studies under 
review are characterized by methodological similarities in the employment of regression analysis and sampled 
companies namely: listed non-financial firms. The study concludes that no globally accepted risk disclosure 
determinants exist at present and offer that policy makers put in place a framework for risk disclosure pattern of 
companies to ensure credible, comparable, consistent and easy to follow but tough to escape material risk 
reporting around the globe. Besides, extending the frontiers of knowledge on risk disclosure to developing 
economy, the paper gives the ongoing debate on risk disclosure determinants a global approach towards 
contributing to search on convergent risk reporting dynamics.   
Keywords: Annual reports, Determinants, Risk, Voluntary disclosure, Proprietary cost, Non-financial firms.  
 
1. Introduction 
The quality of voluntary disclosure contained in annual reports, the principal source of corporate communication, 
is in the heart of modern financial reporting. Lack of investors’ confidence trailed corporate failures of major 
companies around the globe (Ame, 2013). The credibility crisis coupled with threats of terrorists’ attack on firms 
and the global financial crisis led to calls for better disclosure, to enable informed investment decisions. 
Consequently, corporate annual reports no longer focus solely on the accounts - quantitative information but 
volunteer qualitative information about a variety of topics such as the company’s risks. Voluntary risk disclosure 
can be defined as facultative publication concerning firms’ strategies, characteristics, operations and other 
external factors that have the potentials to affect expected results (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004).   
Since risk taking is required in creating firm value (Onoja, 2014), voluntary risk disclosure can be 
beneficial for several reasons. Besides mitigating information asymmetry between management and external 
shareholders, risk disclosure can have positive effects on the trust and confidence stakeholders have in the firm’s 
management. It may decrease the firm’s perceived risk because an open disclosure strategy supposedly results in 
a better assessment of the firm’s future performance. This, in turn, can lead to a decline in the firm’s cost of 
capital (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Botosan, 2006; Brealy, Myers & Allen, 2006) and to a reduced possibility of 
financial failure (Solomon, Solomon & Norton, 2000; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004).  
However, Taylor, (2011) states that communicating risk management and performance is inherently 
problematic, especially for narrative disclosures. The difficulty in risk disclosure arises from “commercial 
sensitivity” of the information, which means that disclosing risk information can result to strategic exploitation 
by competitors and also the fact that inexact forward looking risk information can incite investors to sue the firm. 
For these reasons, Linsley & Shrives (2006) are of the opinion that corporate managers may not want to disclose 
risk information in annual reports. Their opinion confirms the proprietary costs hypothesis that, a third party 
whose interests are not aligned with the firm’s interests can use the disclosed information against this firm’s 
welfare. The impact of proprietary costs on firm value and its competitive position can lead to voluntary risk 
disclosure dilemma. 
Consequently, research attention has been directed towards determining the possible drivers of risk 
disclosure practices of companies across the globe. Strand of literature providing empirical evidences for 
different countries’ risk reporting behaviors include Italy (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004), Australia (Carton et al., 
2003), Canada (Lajili & Zeghal, 2005), UK (Klaus, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007, 
Rajab & Handler-Schachler, 2009; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012), Japan (Mohobbot, 2005), Netherlands (Deumes 
& Knechel, 2008),  Belgium (Vandamaele, Verguawen & Michiels 2009), China (Li & Qian-Qian, 2010), 
Malaysia (Nargess & Siti-Zaleha, 2012), United Arab Emirate (Hassan, 2009), Portugal (Oliveira & Rodriguez, 
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2011), US (Kravet & Muslu, 2011), UK, US, Germany and Canada (Dobler, Lajili & Zeghal, 2011), Nigeria 
(Achua & Onoja, 2013; Onoja, 2014).  
These studies variously explored the determinants of risks disclosure in corporate annual reports. 
However, majority of the findings suffered from discrepancies and inconsistency in that no globally accepted 
determinants of risk disclosure still constitute a research issue. This paper reviews extant literature on corporate 
risk reporting in an endeavor to give the ongoing debate on the determinants of risk disclosure a global approach 
towards contributing to the search on convergent risk reporting dynamics. It is hoped that the study could deliver 
hints for future regulation as policy makers world-wide review risk reporting regulations following the recent 
past corporate scandals, crises and collapses. It would benefit corporate managers in areas of internal control and 
risk management systems and as well, extend the frontiers of knowledge on the subject matter. 
 
2.Theoretical and empirical review 
The concept of risk disclosure and risk categories 
The concept of risk stems from the inability to see into the future. Risk is viewed as an “uncertainty as to the 
amount of benefits” which “include both potential for gain or exposure to loss” (ICAEW, 1999). Linsley & 
Shrives (2006) define risk disclosure as informing the reader about “any opportunity or prospect, or of any 
hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the 
company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”. 
This paper upholds this definition for its simplicity. 
A lot of risk categorizations exist in the literature about risk disclosure. However, this paper reviews 
four comprehensive risk categories namely: business risk, financial risk, operational risk, and compliance (legal, 
tax and regulatory) risk.   
Business risk refers to the typical risks a company faces: uncertainty about the demand for products, the 
price that can be charged for those products, the cost of producing, stocking and delivering the products (Crouhy, 
Galai, & Mark, 2006). The risk associated with actions by competitors and potential losses of competitive 
advantage are other examples of business risk (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Servaes & Tufano, 2006). Business risk 
broadly incorporates strategic risk and reputation risk. Strategic risk refers to the risk associated with significant 
investments for which high uncertainty exists about success and profitability (Crouhy et al., 2006). A firm 
investing in research and development (R&D), for example, encounters uncertainty about the relation between 
its R&D investment and new product or process outputs (Miller, 1992). Reputation risk refers to the risk that a 
good reputation, which can lead to value creation, turns to a bad reputation and, as a consequence, company 
value being destroyed (Vandamaele et al., 2009). In sum, business risk can be seen as internal company skill(s) 
for dealing with the competitive environment in which the company operates. 
Financial risk consists of market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. Market risk relates to price 
movements in financial markets (Servaes & Tufano, 2006). Crouhy et al. (2006) define market risk as “the risk 
that changes in financial market prices and rates will reduce the value of a security or portfolio”. Market risk 
arises because of a number of factors, such as interest rate exposures, foreign exchange exposures, commodity 
price-sensitive revenues or expenses, stock option plans and pension liabilities. Credit risk is the possibility that 
the payment of contractual obligations may not be fulfilled by the counterparty (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). 
Giesecke (2004) defines credit risk as “the distribution of financial losses due to unexpected changes in the credit 
quality of a counterparty in a financial agreement”. Liquidity risk occurs when a company is not able to meet the 
payment of commitments it has made (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004).  
Operational risk relates to potential losses due to inadequate or failing internal processes, people and 
systems or resulting from external events. Crouhy et al. (2006) distinguish three major types of operational risk. 
The first type is technology risk, principally the risk is associated with computer systems. It implies the risks 
involved with information access, information availability and infrastructure (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). Alvarez 
(2001) describes technology risk as the loss events “due to piracy, theft, failure, breakdown, or other disruptions 
in technology, data or information”. The second type is fraud risk by management or employees. The third type 
of operational risk is human factor risk; it relates to potential losses resulting from human errors (e.g. 
accidentally destroying a file). Alvarez (2001) adds as a fourth type of operational risk, external loss events (e.g. 
following a natural disaster).  
Compliance (legal, tax and regulatory) risk arises for a whole variety of reasons. Examples of legal risk 
include the involvement in lawsuits or the infringement of legal norms and a change in tax law which may have 
vast implications for a firm.  
The paper reviews the different risk categories to create an understanding of the risks a company has to 
deal with. Cabedo & Tirado (2004) state that information about different risk categories does not only help 
companies in understanding, identifying, monitoring and controlling of risks but also improves the investors’ 
knowledge about the companies’ risks profile. However, against the backdrop of the cost-induced risk disclosure 
dilemma, what motivates managers to disclose more risk information than it is necessitated by regulation 
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becomes insightful within the context of theoretical frameworks. 
 
Theoretical setting of voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure is a game of contradictory powers (motivating forces and dissuasive forces). The process of 
voluntary disclosure results thus, from an arbitration between the economy of costs (agency, political, capital 
costs) that this publication can procure to the company, and the generation of costs (proprietary and non-
proprietary costs) as a result of this publication. The theoretical incentives for voluntary disclosure enable 
managers manage different levels of risk disclosure for two reasons: To achieve economic objectives and, to 
respect rules and societal standards. These theories include: 
Agency theory: This explains how the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers can 
be reduced by the implementation of risk management systems and incentives to managers, in order to monitor 
their attitudes towards risk and to assure the disclosure of information beyond the strictly necessary about risk 
factors and their risk management activities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Signaling theory:  This theory explains managers’ attitude to voluntarily disclosure more information to 
the market, than that required by regulations, to signal their behavior of best practice, as tactic to promote 
transparency with the intention of attracting more investment (Spencer, 1973; Ross, 1977; Morris, 1987). 
Consequently, the companies belonging to the same industry will be interested in disclosing at least the same 
level of information, because they do not want to be unevaluated by the market, expressing mimetic 
isomorphism behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Legitimacy theory: Legitimacy theory explains that this mimetic isomorphism behavior is a way of 
reducing transaction costs associated with the information asymmetry, in order to generate conformity with 
institutional and society pressures (Shocker & Sethi, 1974; Deephouse, 1996) and gain legitimacy towards 
society by showing that the entity’s action are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. 
Stakeholder theory:  The theory explains the influence of stakeholders in the firm decisions and 
consequently, the role of management in order to achieve the exact level of stakeholder demand, because if the 
level of stakeholder power increases so the importance of meeting stakeholders demand (Freeman, 1984). If risk 
management activities are viewed as an effective management activity for dealing with stakeholders, a positive 
relationship between power, management performance and risk management disclosures is expected (Ullman, 
1985). 
Political cost theory: Political cost theory explains that to mitigate potential political costs, politically 
visible companies increase their disclosures, in order to manipulate their image and distract other’s attention 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Deegan and Gordon, 1996). If there is room for managerial discretion in choosing 
reporting features as disclosure format or precision, managers can report on risk in different ways depending on 
their perceptions of potential reactions of the users of that information, in order to fulfill their investment or 
disinvestment policies. 
Attribution theory: This explains that managers try to “attribute bad things to factors beyond the 
directors’ control and good things attributed to their personal achievements in controlling risks”. (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006). Thus, any risk disclosure is followed by a risk management disclosure in order to demonstrate to 
the stakeholders their ability to manage the external factors faced by the company. 
Despite theoretical incentives, the costs that are likely to be incurred by the firms for voluntarily 
disclosed information limit their communication. Some arguments in favour of the retention of voluntary 
disclosure are in respect of costs (proprietary and non-proprietary costs).  
Proprietary costs hypothesis: Proprietary costs appear when a third party, whose interests are not 
aligned with the firm’s interests, uses the disclosed information against the firm. According to the proprietary 
costs hypothesis, the firm can limit its disclosure to avoid its strategic exploitation by competitors. The impact of 
the proprietary costs on the firm value and its competitive position can lead to retention of the information. Also, 
the communication of certain information can, in some cases, significantly cause harm to the firm and lead to 
legal pursuits (litigation costs). For instance, inexact forward looking risk publication can incite investors to sue 
the firm.  
Direct costs: These costs are induced by the publication of voluntary information and include collection, 
treatment, production, diffusion, printing costs (Depoers, 2000). According to Leuz & Wysocki (2006), it is 
difficult to quantify direct costs associated to disclosure activity especially if they consist of opportunity costs 
such as managerial time. 
 
Prior Studies on risk disclosure  
The cost-induced voluntary disclosure dilemma in the wake of quest for better risk disclosure has engendered 
research on the determinants of risk disclosure in corporate annual reports. Most of these studies focus on non-
financial companies in a particular country and examine among others the relationship between the level of risk 
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disclosure and firm size, profitability, financial leverage, board composition, CEO duality, audit quality, cross 
listing, industry type, risk committee, systematic risk and liquidity. We review some of these studies as follows: 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) propose a framework for the analysis of firm risk communication for Italian 
companies listed in the ordinary market of the Italian Stock Exchange. Using regression analysis for a sample of 
85 non-financial firms, the study found that the index of disclosure quantity is not influenced by either firm size 
or industry type. They verified that the framework and synthetic index are not influenced by the two factors 
recognized in the literature as the most powerful drivers of disclosure behavior for listed firms. 
Klaus (2005) conducts a study to investigate the extent and determinants of risk disclosure for UK listed 
companies. He used a sample of 50 business support and services firms. Using regression analysis, the study 
found that narrative risk disclosure of UK firms is positively related to firm size, gearing, internal audit, average 
substantial shareholdings and independent non-executive directors while non-executive director, audit committee 
size, free float and profitability (ROCE) are negatively associated with risk disclosure.  
Similarly, Mohobbot (2005) examines the corporate risk reporting practices of 90 non-financial 
Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Using Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the study 
revealed that the company size (total assets) and the number of risk disclosure are significantly positively 
correlated while no significant relation was found between number of risk disclosure and level of risk, relative 
profitability (ROA and ROE) and ownership distribution pattern.  
Linsley & Shrives (2006) conduct a study on the risk disclosure practices of 79 UK companies. Using 
regression analysis, the study found a significant association between the number of risk disclosures and 
company size and level of environmental risk. They however found no association between the number of risk 
disclosures and other measures of risk namely gearing, asset cover, beta factors, and book to market value of 
equity used in the study. 
Similarly, Abraham & Cox (2007) investigated the relationship between the quantity of narrative risk 
information in UK FTSE 100 corporate annual reports and ownership, governance and US listing characteristics. 
The study found, using regression analysis, that number of executive and independent directors have positive 
relationship with level of corporate risk reporting while institutional ownership and number of dependent non-
executive directors have negative relationship with level of corporate risk reporting. Their findings support the 
recent emphasis in the UK on the independent aspects of non-executive directors for good corporate governance. 
Deumes & Knechel (2008) also conduct a study on the economic incentive for voluntary reporting on 
internal risk management and control systems of Dutch firms for the period (1997-1999). Using ordered probit 
regression analysis and a sample of 192 Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the study found 
that financial leverage has a positive and significant relationship with extent of disclosure while managerial 
ownership and ownership concentration have negative relationship with extent of internal control disclosure. 
Again, Hassan (2009) conducts a study to explore the relationship between the UAE corporations’-
specific characteristics – size, level of risk, industry type and reserve, and level of CRD. The study used content 
analysis to determine the risk disclosure level and multiple regression analysis to examine the impact of the 
identified characteristics on risk disclosure. The result for a sample of 41 corporations revealed that the corporate 
level of risk and corporate industry type are significant explanatory variables of CRD. The study further revealed 
that corporate size is not significantly associated with level of CRD; corporate reserve is insignificant and 
negatively associated with level of CRD. 
Rajab (2009) empirically examines the influence of firm size, leverage, industry and US dual listing on 
the level of risk disclosure in annual reports of 52 UK non-financial companies drawn from the FTSE-100 index 
for three different periods (1998, 2001 and 2004). The study used content analysis to measure risk disclosure 
sentences, panel data and regression model to examine the impact of the identified variables on risk disclosure. 
The study found that US dual listing and industry have significant relationship with risk disclosures but firm size 
and leverage have insignificant association with the level of risk disclosures of sampled companies. Concerning 
impact of risk disclosures on companies’ cost of equity capital, the study found no relationship between risk 
disclosure level and companies’ cost of equity capital (measured by four-stage dividend growth model). It 
however, found a negative and significant relationship between risk information and the proxies of information 
asymmetry namely stock volatility and bid-ask spread. 
Rajab & Handley-Schachler (2009) also conduct a study to investigate the trends and determinants of 
corporate risk disclosure by UK firms for the periods (1998, 2001, and 2004). Using panel data analysis and a 
sample of 52 UK listed companies, the study revealed that US dual listing and involvement in heavy industry 
have positive and significant effect on the level of risk disclosure. Company size (turnover) and leverage 
(debt/equity) are found to have negative association with the level of risk information disclosed by sampled 
companies.  
Similarly, Vandamaele, Verguawen & Michiels (2009) empirically examine the determinants of 
management risk reporting practices of Belgian companies listed on Euronext. The study used content analysis 
to determine the risk disclosure level and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model to examine the impact 
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of firm and governance characteristics on risk disclosures. The result for a sample of 46 non-financial firms 
revealed that both size (sales) and systematic risk (beta) have positive and significant relationship with level of 
risk disclosure. Profitability (ROA) has negative and significant relationship while other variables – board 
composition, risk committee, CEO duality and audit quality have statistically insignificant relationship with risk 
disclosure level. 
Li & Qian-Qian (2010) also investigate the determinants of narrative risk disclosure of 75 Chinese 
companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Using regression analysis the study found that company size 
(total assets) and director independency had significant and positive relationship with the number of risk 
disclosure while institutional ownership had statistically significant but negative association with risk disclosure. 
The study also found no association between the number of risk disclosure and other measures namely 
counterbalance of big stockholders, earnings power (ROA) and leverage (assets-liability ratio). 
Similarly, Dobler, Lajili & Zeghal (2011) carry out multi-country investigation of the attributes of 
corporate risk disclosure and its association with level of firm risks. The study based on detailed content analysis 
of the annual reports of 160 manufacturing companies in the US, Germany, UK and Canada. The result revealed 
that risk disclosure in management reports concentrates mostly on financial risk categories and comprises little 
quantitative and forward looking disclosures across sample countries. In terms of disclosure quantity, the study 
found that US firms dominated followed by German firms and that cross country variation in risk disclosure 
attributes are linked to domestic disclosure regulations. While risk disclosure quantity has positive association 
with firm risk in North America, the study found a negative association with leverage for German firms. This is 
the first multi-country study within the reach of the researcher and it suggests that domestic disclosure 
regulations to some extent determine the quantity of risk disclosures amongst countries. 
In another study, Kravet & Muslu (2011) examine textual risk disclosures in US-quoted companies’ 10-
K reports between 1994 and 2007. Using content analysis for a sample of 28,110 firms year observations, they 
quantified firm risk disclosures by counting the number of sentences that contain key words (such as ‘risk’, 
‘uncertain’, ‘may’, ‘might’ etc.) and compared year-on-year changes in the level of disclosures. The study found 
increased stock return volatility and trading volume around and after the (10-K) filings; that increases in risk 
disclosure are associated with more dispersed earnings forecast and forecast revisions after the filings. These 
findings suggest that risk disclosures reveal unknown unknowns and increase the market perception of risks and 
uncertainties. 
Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) examine the determinants of narrative risk information in the interim 
reports for a sample of 72 UK non-financial companies. They use content analysis to measure the level of risk 
information and the Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis to examine the impact of the potential drivers on 
narrative risk disclosures. The study found that firm size and industry type have positive association with level of 
narrative risk disclosure in interim reports while liquidity, gearing, profitability and cross listing have 
statistically insignificant impact on narrative risk disclosures. 
Nargess & Siti-Zaleha (2012) conduct a study to investigate the impact of firm size (total assets), firm 
complexity, industries, financial leverage (debt/assets ratio), auditor type, board independency, assets opacity 
(intangible assets to total assets ratio), stock price volatility, institutional ownership and country of domicile, on 
risk management adoption of 90 Malaysian public listed companies. Using logistic regression analysis, the result 
revealed that only financial leverage and audit type had a positive and significant influence on Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) adoption in Malaysia. 
Musa, (2013) also assesses the effect of company leverage on corporate risk disclosure. Using 
regressions analysis for data relating to 2010 annual reports of 12 companies, the study concludes that corporate 
risk disclosure is not significantly related to company leverage.    
Onoja, (2014) examines the influence of firm size, profitability, financial leverage, board composition 
and audit quality on the extent of risk disclosure for 88 listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Using content 
analysis and multiple regressions analysis, the study found significant positive and negative relations for firm 
size and profitability respectively with level of risk disclosure. Financial leverage, board composition and audit 
quality have statistically insignificant impact on risk disclosures. 
 
3. Methodology  
The study seeks to review empirical literature on voluntary risk disclosure in corporate annual reports. The study 
adopts qualitative-archival research methodology involving secondary information obtained from journal articles, 
corporate finance texts and MSc. dissertation for the review. This approach is informed by the nature of the topic 
under study. Works of authors from 2004 to 2014 are used for the review. 
 
4. Summary of findings 
The review of prior studies presented above highlights twin research problems. First, results of the studies are 
inconclusive as to what are the actual determinants of risk disclosure practices of firms across the globe. For 
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instance, the studies of Mohobbot (2005); Klaus (2005); Linsley & Shrives (2006); Li & Qian-Qian (2010) and 
Onoja (2014) found a positive and significant relationship between company size and the extent of risk 
disclosure. Conversely, a negative relationship is found between company size and risk disclosure in the studies 
of Beretta & Bozzolan (2004); Rajab & Handler-Schachler (2009); Nargess & Siti-Zaleha (2012). While Linsley 
& Shrives (2006); Rajab & Handler-Schachler (2009); Li & Qian-Qian (2010) and Onoja (2014) documented a 
negative association between financial leverage and risk disclosure, Klaus (2005); Duemes & Knechel (2008); 
and Nargess & Siti-zaleha (2010) documented a positive leverage-risk disclosure relationship. Rajab & Handler-
Schachler (2009) found a positive industry type-risk disclosure relationship but Beretta & Bozzolan(2004); 
Nargess & Siti-zaleha (2012) reported a negative relationship. Also, Klaus (2005); Abraham & Cox (2008) and 
Li & Qian-Qian (2010) confirmed positive as against negative risk-board composition effect documented by 
Nargess & Siti-zaleha (2012) and Onoja (2014). Furthermore, Klaus (2005) and Nargess & Siti-zaleha (2012) 
found positive risk-audit quality relation in contrast to negative relation documented by Vandamele et al., (2009) 
and Onoja (2014). The discrepancies notwithstanding the fact that most of the studies are characterized by 
methodological similarities in employment of content analysis, regression analysis and sampled companies 
namely: listed non-financial firms.  
Secondly, most of the studies are from developed economy. There are relatively few studies from 
developing economies, indicating paucity of empirical evidence.  
 
Conclusion 
The study reviews extant literature on risk disclosure determinants of companies across the globe. The findings 
of the study show that there are no globally accepted determinants of risk disclosure. Reasons adduced for this 
phenomenon include regulatory frameworks, institutional settings and constraints and other peculiarities of 
countries of study. Also, the study reveals a research gap in the literature in respect of developing economies. 
The findings imply that the search for empirical determinants of risk disclosure in companies’ annual reports still 
constitute a research issue. Besides suggesting further studies especially in developing economies, the policy 
implication of this result is that hence risk reporting is voluntary and no globally accepted determinant in sight to 
influence the content of the disclosure, policy makers should put in place a framework for risk disclosure pattern 
of companies that would ensure credible, comparable, consistent and easy to follow but tough to escape material 
risk reporting. This paper contributes to extant literature by not only extending the frontiers of knowledge on 
corporate risk disclosure to a developing economy but also give the ongoing debate on the determinants of risk 
disclosure a global approach towards contributing to the search on convergent risk reporting dynamics. 
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